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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the effects of corporate governance on CEO compensation in light of 
regulatory controls introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  The influence of 
economic and corporate governance variables on incentive-based CEO compensation are 
considered, using cross-section time-series panel data that includes multiple observations for the 
years 1999 to 2005.  As expected, sales, firm performance (returns), and CEO age were found to 
positively affect the incentive components of CEO compensation.  CEO duality, board size, and 
the percentage of outside directors had a significant influence on CEO compensation in the pre-
SOX, but not post-SOX, period.  The influences of these three variables in the pre-SOX period 
were not in the expected directions. Stratification of our sample into two groups by size reveals 
similarities and differences between smaller and larger firms. For both groups, economic 
determinants are more dominant than corporate governance variables as determinants of 
incentive-based CEO compensation.  We find differences in the pattern and significance of 
variables between the smaller and larger firms, particularly for corporate governance variables, 
pre- and post-SOX. These results suggest that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms may vary by size of company.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
s the level of CEO compensation has risen over the years, research in this subject has grown 
concomitantly. Investors, regulators, and researchers continue to have an interest in how CEO 
compensation is determined and disclosed. Boards of directors, as representatives of shareholders, 
determine CEO compensation. Corporate governance is viewed as an important aspect of the ability of boards of 
directors to act on behalf of shareholders in a way that properly aligns the interests of CEOs and shareholders in 
compensation contracts. 
 
The theoretical foundation of such work lies with principal-agency theory (Ross, 1973; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1983), which in turn can be traced to Berle and Means (1932). The theory 
describes the separation of firm ownership (principal) and choices by management (agent). Researchers have 
buttressed the principal/agent disconnect along several dimensions: demographics (Young and Buchholtz, 2002), 
stock-based compensation (Jensen, 2005) and its relationship to earnings restatement (Cheng and Farber, 2008), 
CEO relationships (Brown et al., 2009; Larcker et al., 2005), risk (Guay, 1999), board independence (Kumar and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2008), industry regulation (Agrawal et al., 1991; Anderson et al., 2000; Arya and Sun, 2004; 
Bryan and Hwang, 1997), voluntary reporting on internal control (Owusu-Ansah and Ganguli, 2010), and firm size 
(Lambert et al., 1991). 
 
A 
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One reaction to perceived principal-agent imbalance is the rise of the corporate governance movement that, 
simply stated, attempts to strengthen stakeholder input by reducing restrictions imposed by management. Particular 
corporate governance structures and mechanisms are thought to increase the likelihood that boards will act in the 
best interest of shareholders. This is expected to result in positive outcomes for shareholders, such as appropriate 
levels of CEO compensation, improved performance, and increased firm value.  
 
Ever-increasing CEO compensation and the collapse of Enron and WorldCom in 2001 are two instances of 
principal-agent asymmetry perceived by the public. A consequence of the latter events was the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
1
 that tacitly embraced optimal contracting (see below). For example, the 
passage of SOX and related listing requirements approved by the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) require a range of “good” corporate governance practices. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the CEO compensation and various 
economic and governance variables and to discern the influence of these variables over time as affected by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
2
  Our analyses are based on the cross-section, time-series panel data for a set of companies for 
the period 1999-2005 to examine incentive components of CEO compensation.  As such, we curtail variability of the 
results that may stem from changes in the CEO over our examination period.   
 
In the next section we present the review of literature related to influence of corporate governance on CEO 
compensation and evidence related to the effects of SOX. The third section covers the research hypotheses and 
methodology. Sample selection process and information about our data and the research method appear in section 
four. Then we present the analyses and results in the fifth section. In the final section of this paper we summarize 
our findings and discuss limitations and opportunities for further investigations. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The relationship between corporate governance and executive compensation, firm performance, and other 
important corporate outcomes has long been of interest to scholars. Good corporate governance, including the 
appropriate mix of directors on the board and key board committees, is an important component in monitoring 
management for shareholders. Conversely, poor corporate governance is likely to increase “managerial power” 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Fahlenbrach, 2009). For example, outside, 
independent directors are considered to be better situated to make unbiased decisions about executive compensation 
(see, e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, outside directors may be selected and influenced by 
management, and may also lack the time or interest to properly monitor management (Jensen, 1993). Weak 
corporate governance may allow opportunistic behavior and entrenchment by management (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004; Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
 
As noted by Brown et al. (2009, p. 2), the arguably competing hypotheses are the “optimal contracting 
approach,” based on the premise that the value of the firm is maximized if executive compensation is designed to 
minimize agency costs, and the “managerial power approach” as proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2002). The managerial 
power approach states that CEO influence over their pay might impose substantial shareholder cost “beyond the 
excess pay executives receive—by diluting and distorting managers’ incentives and thereby hurting corporate 
performance” (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, p. 72; also see Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). 
 
Several studies have found declines in incentive compensation and risk Post-SOX (Cohen et al., 2009), 
earnings management in relation to SOX (Cohen et al., 2004; Carter et al., 2006), and tenure, turnover and risk 
aversion (Wang et al., 2010). Li and Srinivasan (2010) demonstrated that founding directors earn more than non-
founders, but cash compensation is unrelated to corporate earnings (Shaw and Zhang, 2010). Likewise, Larcker et 
                                                 
1 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (H.R. 3763). 
2 Many of these specific regulations were actually proposed by self-regulatory organizations (NYSE and NASDAQ) and were 
approved by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2003. Following Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), we 
treat 2003 as the first year Post-SOX (i.e., after Sarbanes-Oxley was passed and these regulations were likely to be followed by 
most corporations). 
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al. (2010) found a negative correlation between CEO compensation and abnormal returns, and others found strong 
evidence of CEO compensation and weak corporate governance (Core et al., 1999). Fahlenbrach (2009) notes that 
weaker governance may serve the interests of shareholders and the CEO through substitution of governance 
mechanisms with higher levels of performance pay.  
 
The structure and activities of the compensation committee has been of obvious interest to researchers and 
regulators. Although SOX requires 100 percent outside, independent directors on compensation committees, 
regulations and best practices pushed companies toward this goal much earlier (Andersen and Bizjak, 2003). Prior 
research reveals limited impact of the membership attributes of the compensation committee on CEO compensation 
(Andersen and Bizjak, 2003; Petra and Dorata, 2008). 
 
One purpose of SOX was to require certain "best” practices for all public companies in order to improve 
corporate governance and board monitoring of management. Before the passage of SOX, many corporations had 
already adopted some, or all, of these best practices. There is some evidence that SOX has had the intended impact. 
For example, prior research demonstrates that companies with poorer corporate governance pre-SOX had larger 
reductions in CEO compensation post-SOX than those with better corporate governance practices (Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein, 2009).  More specifically, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) found that, after implementation of 
SOX requirements, CEO compensation dropped significantly more for those companies that had voluntarily adopted 
fewer of these requirements prior to SOX (non-compliant companies) compared with those companies that had 
adopted more of these requirements prior to SOX (compliant companies). 
 
Carter et al. (2009) suggest the impact of pre-SOX "upward" earnings management was counteracted by 
more emphasis on earnings changes in bonus contracts post-SOX to reduce the effect of earnings management.  
These studies strongly suggest that mandated improvements in corporate governance can lead to improved 
monitoring by boards of directors.  
 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND METHODS 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance on CEO compensation pre- and 
post-SOX.  Our examination is based on the comparison of CEO compensation as affected by the enactment of the 
SOX. We anticipate CEO compensation contracts to be influenced by the corporate governance structure as new 
regularity measures were introduced while economic determinants of such contracting remain the same over the 
examination period.  
 
In this section we present the general model for estimating the CEO compensation. Then we modify the 
model to include governance variables we expect to have differential influence as we compare pre and post- SOX 
compensation data. 
 
Estimation of CEO Compensation Model. Many executive compensation studies have analyzed the pay-
performance relationship utilizing a model generally specified as follows: 
 
PAYit   =   +  ß (SIZEit)  +   (PERFORMANCEit )  +  it     (1) 
 
where Payit is the CEO compensation of firm i, year t, SIZEit is the size of firm i, year t, PERFORMANCEit is an 
observable performance measure of firm i, year t, and it is the error term. 
 
Economic Determinants of CEO Compensation.  Certain economic outcomes should be related to the activities of 
management. Therefore, CEO compensation should be a function of those economic determinants. We expect 
greater CEO compensation for larger, more complex, and more profitable firms.  
 
We expand the basic compensation model (1) to include governance variables as shown below: 
 
ln(PAYit) =  +  ln(SIZEit) + γ (PERFORMANCEit) + (GOVERNANCEit)+ it      (2)  
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Corporate Governance and CEO Compensation.  In addition to economic determinants, corporate governance 
may have a positive or negative influence on contracting with the CEO. Prior research suggests that CEO 
compensation is greater when the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors (Core et al., 1999; Grinstein 
and Hribar, 2004). While this relationship could indicate more responsibilities for the CEO, it is more often 
considered to increase the CEO’s power and influence over the board, thus reducing its monitoring capabilities. We 
also include the age of CEOs to represent the experience and, possibly, influence of the CEO on the board. Prior 
studies also indicate that as boards grow larger, they become less effective at monitoring (Jensen, 1993) and CEO 
compensation may be larger and/or less sensitive to performance. Although prior research generally supports this 
assumption (Core et al., 1999; Fahlenbrach, 2009), Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find the opposite. Therefore, the 
relationship between board size and CEO compensation may not be linear, or may be affected by other factors.   
 
We expect outside, independent directors to be more objective and to better serve shareholders. The 
compensation committee is charged with determining CEO compensation, which is then approved by the board. 
Post-SOX, a majority of board directors are required to be outside, independent directors and all compensation 
committee members are required to be outside, independent directors. We measure the independence of the total 
board of directors by calculating the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the 
board. Regarding compensation committee independence, prior research indicates that this attribute has little 
influence on CEO compensation and that most companies already were in compliance with outside directors on the 
compensation committee pre-SOX (Andersen and Bizjak, 2003; Petra and Dorata, 2008). We expect little pre-SOX 
variation in this attribute and no post-SOX variation. Therefore, we do not include a measure of compensation 
committee independence in our study. However, we do expect that compensation committees that are more 
representative of independent directors on the full board, and those that are more diligent, will be more effective in 
their monitoring. We expect larger compensation committees (relative to total board size) and compensation 
committees that meet more often (relative to the number of total board meetings) to be associated with smaller CEO 
compensation.  
 
We analyze the relationship between CEO compensation and performance using a logarithmic 
transformation of the general model in order to reduce the problem of heteroscedasticity in the error terms. It is 
expected that that this measure of CEO compensation is influenced by the decisions of the board of directors and the 
compensation committee. In the next section we describe the data and the research design. 
 
We use a panel data of cross-section-time series in our estimation model, as shown below: 
 
Log_PayPerform it =  + (Log_Salesit) + γ(Ret_3yrit) + 1(Ageit) + 2(CEO_Chairit) + 3(CCMeet_BdMeetit)+ 
4(CCSize_BdSizeit) + 5 (OutDir_BdSize) +  6(Log_BdSizeit) + it  +  v it         (3) 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
 
This section describes the sample, data sources and variable measurement. All compensation and financial 
data for this study are drawn from Standard & Poor’s (2007) ExecuComp database covering the period 1999-2005.  
 
We use variable components of the CEO compensation, by subtracting salary and “other compensation” 
from the total ex-ante compensation, to examine the influence of the economic and governance variables.  We 
calculate the logarithm of this Pay for Performance compensation measure as the dependent variable 
(Log_PayPerform) for our model.  
 
  We use sales as proxy for size and complexity. We also use logarithm of sales (Log_Sales) as the proxy for 
the firm’s size and complexity. Our regression model incorporates a market based measure of performance. To 
measure firm performance, we include the three-year total return as the measure of firm performance in our model. 
We use three-year total return to shareholders, including the monthly reinvestment of dividends, (Ret_3yr), 
including the monthly reinvestment of dividends. 
 
Additional governance data are collected from annual proxy statements (Form DEF14A) as filed with the 
SEC though the EDGAR archives. They are: (a) the number of directors on the board; (b) the number of the 
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compensation committee members; (c) the number of annual meetings of the board of directors; (d) the number of 
annual meetings of the compensation committee; and (e) CEO duality. 
 
We expand the compensation model (2) to include several governance variables including CEO age, a 
binary dummy variable to control for CEO duality (CEO_Chair), and use the logarithm of number of directors 
(Log_BdSize) to measure the effect of the size of the board on CEO compensation. Three ratios, the number of 
outside directors in relation to the board size (OutDir_BdSize), compensation committee size relative to the size of 
the board of directors (CCSize_BdSize), and the compensation committee meetings relative to the number of board 
meetings (CCMeet_BdMeet), are calculated as indicators for the independence of the board and the compensation 
committee influence and diligence. These variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
 
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This sample is obtained from an initial sample of 2,398 U.S. firms after imposing the condition that data 
extend over the entire period 1999 to 2005. This condition is imposed to guarantee homogeneity in the pay-
performance relationship and to control to some degree for human capital heterogeneity within firms before and 
after the enactment of SOX in 2002. The sample was reduced to 318 firms and 2,226 firm-years, referred to as the 
“Full Sample.” Table 1 presents the summary of the sample selection process. 
 
 
Table 1 
Sample Selection 
 Number of Firms CEO-Year 
Initial Sample 2,398 16,729 
Less:    Missing annual data during 1999-2005  2,043 14,244 
Less:    Missing data/ variables  37 259 
Full Sample 318 2,226 
 
 
Detailed information about industry composition of the sample is presented in Table 2. The sample 
encompasses 25 industries, with 2-digit SIC ranging from 01 to 99. The largest sample representation is the 
Industrial Machines and Equipment, with 36 firms or about 11.3 percent of the sample, followed by Chemical 
Manufacturing with 31 firms (9.7 percent), Electrical Equipment 28 firms (8.8 percent), Banks and Savings and 
Loans 27 firms (8.5 percent), Insurance and Other Financials 24 firms (7.5 percent), Service 20 firms (6.3 percent), 
etc.  
 
Financial statement data such as sales, total assets, ROA, ROE, total return to shareholders (RET) are 
obtained from ExecuComp Database. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3. Panel A displays certain firm 
characteristics for the sample. The average firm in the sample has $7,217.081 million in sales and $14,890.94 
million in total assets. The average market capitalization is $10,916.99 million. The average firm is profitable as 
indicated by the average ROA, ROE and RET. Panel B displays three measures of total compensation. These 
measures are obtained from the ExecuComp Database. The ex-ante average CEO total compensation (TDC1) is 
$5,776.534 thousand while the amounts in 1999 and 2005 were $4,257.207 thousand and $7,021.656 thousand, 
respectively. Panel C displays certain governance characteristics. There are on average 10 directors sitting on the 
Board and in 70.53% of the firms the CEO is also the Chairman. 
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Table 2 
Industry Composition 
Industries 2-digit SIC 
Full Sample 
Number of Obs. % 
Apparel 56 28 1.3 
Chemical  Manufacturing 28 217 9.7 
Communication 48 28 1.3 
Construction/Contracting 15, 16, 17 49 2.2 
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 59 35 1.6 
Electrical Equip 36, 196 8.8 
Entertainment & Leisure 39, 79 42 1.9 
Food and Beverages 20, 54, 58 112 5.0 
Household Furniture 57, 14 0.6 
Industrial Machines  & Equip 35, 38 252 11.3 
Insurance and Other Financials 61, 62, 63, 64, 67 168 7.5 
Lumbers & Mills 24, 21 0.9 
Merchandise 53, 42 1.9 
Metals 33, 34 42 1.9 
Manufacturing 22, 23, 25, 30, 31, 32 98 4.4 
Mineral Resources 14 21 0.9 
Oil & gas 13, 29 77 3.5 
Paper Mills Prod 26 56 2.5 
Print Publications 27, 35 1.6 
S&L  and Banks 60 189 8.5 
Services 72, 73, 80, 82, 87 140 6.3 
Transportation Equip 37  133 6.0 
Transportation 40, 42, 44, 45, 55 63 2.8 
Utilities 49 91 4.1 
Wholesale 50, 51 77 3.0 
TOTAL 2226 100 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A      
Sales 2226 7217.081 20320.51 2.361 313335 
Total Assets 2226 14890.94 42654.29 28.312 520755 
Market Cap. 2226 10916.99 26594.69 19.049 275006 
ROA 2226 4.320627 13.87661 -388.316 59.59 
ROE 2198 12.10903 43.03004 -740.231 1274.138 
RET _3yr 2214 13.18836 25.49751 -74.839 280.032 
Panel B      
Total compensation (Ex-ante) 2225 5776.534 7086.137 284.595 106841 
CEO Incentive Compensation (Pay_Perform) 2225 4930.353 6737.83 31.235 106365.9 
Cash Bonus 2226 959.4761 1769.018 0 30402.45 
Panel C      
Age 2223 52.9 6.66 32 78 
CEO Duality 2226 .705301 .4560098 0 1 
Board Size 2226 9.961815 2.922963 4 25 
No. of Outside Directors 2226 7.614106 2.700605 2 22 
Compensation Committee Size 2226 3.857143 1.28055 2 12 
No. of Board Meetings 2225 6.93618 2.767597 3 32 
No. of Comp. Comm. Meetings 2211 4.159656 2.058273 0 17 
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 The sample was partitioned into two time periods, “Before” and “After” SOX, 1999-2002 and 2003-2005, 
respectively. We also partitioned the sample based on average sales for each panel into “Lower Half” and “Upper 
Half” in order to extract the effect of SOX on companies based on company average sales over 1999-2005 as shown 
in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 
Total Sample of 318 Companies 
                              \Time Period 
      Company Size \               
Before SOX 
 (1) 
After SOX  
(2) 
Lower half : based on Average Panel Sales (3) Small Firms 
(159 Cos.) 
Small Firms 
(159 Cos.) 
Upper half : based on Average Panel Sales (4) Large Firms 
(159 Cos.) 
Large firms 
(159 Cos.) 
 
 
We will examine the relationship between CEO incentive pay and economic and governance variables over 
the full period of 1999-2005 as well as the two sub-periods, pre- and post-SOX.  We will also estimate the 
parameters of the model for the lower half of the firms and upper half of the firms in our sample, as measured by the 
average sales over the seven-year period (1999-2005), to refine our estimation process. We will then compare 
estimated parameters for the sub periods and upper and lower half of the sample to determine any statistical 
differences over time and across upper and lower half of the sample. 
 
The sample contains data from a wide variety of firms: those in the Standard & Poor’s 500, Standard and 
Poor’s Mid-Cap 400, and Standard and Poor’s Small-Cap 600, which provide considerable variation in firm size.3 
As noted, the sample period covers a four-year period prior to, and three-year period after, the enactment of SOX. 
 
We use the incentive components of total executive compensation as we deduct total salary and Other 
Annual compensations from the ex-ante total compensation, i.e., the TDC1 variable in ExecuComp data.  TDC1 is 
total compensation comprised of the following: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted Stock 
Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted, Long-Term Incentive Payouts, Stock options are valued at the 
grant-date using ExecuComp’s modified Black and Scholes (1973) methodology.4  
 
We use random effect regression to analyze the impact of economic and governance variables on the CEO 
compensation measure, using a cross-section, time-series panel data that includes seven observations for each firm 
for the years 1999 to 2005.  Panel data have become increasingly relevant in applied research (Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 
2001; Wooldridge, 2002). The panel data analyses employed in this study utilizes spatial and temporal dimensions 
of the balanced panels to capture the relationship of economic and governance structure of the sample companies in 
explaining variations in CEO incentive-based compensation.   
 
The spatial dimension pertains to the set of cross-sectional units of observations. The temporal dimension 
pertains to periodic observations of a set of variables characterizing these cross-sectional units over a particular time 
span. The advantage of pooled estimators over heterogeneous estimators is that individual regressions often yield 
unreliable and implausible coefficients.  
 
If there are N units of observations and if the study is undertaken T time periods, there are potentially NT 
observations consisting of time series of length T on N parallel units. This results in more efficient estimates. 
Furthermore, the use of panel data offers a solution to the problem of bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity. 
Unobserved heterogeneity refers to unobserved qualities present in the unit under consideration but unknown to the 
                                                 
3 The sample consists of 142 S & P 500 firms, 78 Mid-Cap, and 68 Small-Cap firms. Thirty firms did not have S & P 
classification. 
4 ExecuComp’s modified Black-Scholes formula −ExecComp values options using an “expected life” equal to 70% of the actual 
term. In addition, ExecComp sets volatilities below the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile to the 5th and 95th percentile 
volatilities, respectively; similarly, dividend yields above the 95th percentile are reduced to the 95th percentile. 
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researcher. For example, it is rather obvious that all CEO contracts are not the same. Each company has certain 
traits, qualities, characteristics, etc., that are difficult to quantify. In cross-section analysis, unobserved heterogeneity 
is captured by the error term. However, the central assumption of regression theory is that the explanatory variable 
and the error term are uncorrelated, i.e., that the explanatory variable is exogenous. As unobserved heterogeneity is 
captured by the error term, this assumption is violated. With panel data, instead, it is possible to correctly identify 
the true effects, even in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2001).  
 
In the panel data estimation one may choose between the random effect and fixed effect models. According 
to Judge et al. (1988) the difference in results is rather small for a large T and a small N. In the case of a small T 
relative to N the fixed effect model is inefficient though consistent and, as such, a random effect model may be 
preferred. For relatively smaller T the worst in applying the fixed effect model is its inefficiency.  
 
Our methodology enhances analysis of CEO compensation by including periodic observations of a set of 
variables characterizing these cross-sectional units over a particular time span.  As such, panel data analyses are 
more informative, display a higher degree of variability, suffer less from problems of multicollinearity, and have 
more degrees of freedom. 
 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
We present the results of our estimations in three sections. First the results for the full period and pre- and 
post-SOX periods will be presented.  Then, we partition the sample based on firm size and will repeat our 
estimations. Finally, we will compare the estimated parameters for sub-samples to discern incremental affect of 
variables over sub-samples.  
 
Generally, our results indicate a significant positive influence of Log_Sales and Ret_3yr on the CEO 
compensation, at the 1 percent significance level in all estimations except for the results for the smaller firms during 
the post-SOX period when the return variable is not as significant (at the .10 level).  Consistent with prior studies, 
these economic variables appear to significantly and positively affect the incentive compensation of the CEOs. 
 
Furthermore, Age of CEO positively affects CEO compensation for larger firms in the upper half of the 
sample.  This finding seems plausible since CEO’s experience can be a major factor in more established firms.  The 
number of directors, in general, negatively affect the incentive compensation for CEOs in our full sample and pre-
SOX estimations and appears to be significant for smaller firms in both pre and post-SOX results, while the 
coefficient is positive and marginally significant for larger firms during the post-SOX period. The ratio of outside 
directors to the number of board members appears to have a positive and significant effect on CEO incentive pay, 
mainly for smaller firms during the pre-SOX period.  The effects of all other governance variables are generally 
negative but not statistically significant at any conventional level except for the CEO duality, in the full sample 
estimations, and to a lesser degree during the pre-SOX period, which is significant at the 5 percent level. These 
findings are described in more detail in the next section. 
 
The Full period and Pre- and Post-SOX Results 
 
The results of our estimations, using Pay_Perform as the dependent variables, are reported in Table 4. As 
indicated above, sales and returns variable are positive and statistically significant variables, at the .01 level, for the 
full period as well as the pre- and post-SOX periods. CEO’s age variable also appears to have a positive and 
statistically significant influences on CEO incentive pay, albeit it is marginally significant, at the .10 level, during 
the post-SOX period. The percentage of outside directors on the board (OutDir_BdSize) positively and significantly 
affects the CEO’s incentive pay. This result appears to be driven by the pre-SOX data since the variable does not 
have a significant influence on pay post-SOX. 
 
The size of the board of directors and the CEO duality variables have a negative and significant impact, at 
the .05 level, on incentive pay over the full period and during the pre-SOX period.  These are in the unexpected 
direction as compared with findings in prior studies. Other governance variables, CCmeet_BdMeet and 
CCSize_BdSize, have negative coefficient in all three estimations, but are not statistically significant at any 
conventional level. 
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The overall R-Squared for the full period, pre- and post-SOX, as shown in Table 4, is 0.37, 0.32, and 0.45, 
respectively. The joint test of null hypotheses of coefficients of the models equal to zero is rejected for the full 
period, pre- and post-SOX models, as indicated by the Wald χ2 at any significance level.  
 
 
Table 4 
Cross-Section, Time-Series Regression-Random Effect 
Dependent Variable: Log Pay_Perform 
Variables 1999-2005 
Pre- SOX 
1999-2002 
Post- SOX 
2003-2005 
Log_Sales 0.4872919*** 
(20.02) 
0.4442107*** 
(14.74) 
0.4575627*** 
(16.05) 
Ret_3yr 0.6768507*** 
(14.44) 
0.5263709*** 
(8.70) 
0.5026073*** 
(4.89) 
Age 0.0364553*** 
(8.00) 
0.0353598*** 
(5.32) 
0.0104903* 
(1.65) 
CEO_Chair -0.1030312*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.1356021** 
(-2.52) 
-0.0349475 
(-0.52) 
CCMeet_BdMeet -0.0711479 
(-1.50) 
-0.0150389 
(-0.20) 
-0.0118234 
(-0.19) 
CCSize_BdSize -0.2743534 
(-1.59) 
-0.3791091 
(-1.52) 
-0.176747 
(-0.66) 
OutDir_BdSize 0.3660864** 
(2.01) 
0.7572595*** 
(3.14) 
0.0215224 
(0.07) 
Log_BdSize -0.2828075*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.3637396*** 
(-2.61) 
-0.1520373 
(-0.97) 
Constant 2.754774*** 
(8.34) 
3.067581*** 
(6.55) 
4.286949*** 
(8.89) 
R-Squared:    
Within 
between 
overall 
0.2578 
0.4034 
0.3690 
0.1831 
0.3382 
0.3162 
0.1128 
0.4864 
0.4467 
Number of Obs. 2209 1255 954 
Wald 2  850.37 
(0.0000) 
365.57 
(0.0000) 
376.97 
(0.0000) 
Coefficients Significance Level: *** .01, **.05, *.1 
 
 
Partitioned Samples Results 
 
We estimated the parameters of our model by dividing the sample into small and large firms based on the 
average sales over the 7-year period and repeated our analyses for the pre- and post-SOX periods. These results are 
presented in Table 5.  The Log_Sales continues to be a significant explanatory variable for incentive pay regardless 
of partitioning at the .01 level. The Ret_3yr also appears to have a significant and positive impact on CEO incentive 
pay during the pre-SOX period for both small and large firms, at the .01 level.  This variable remains highly 
significant for larger firms during post-SOX period, but is only marginally significant, at the .10 level, during this 
period for smaller firms. 
 
Among governance variables, Age appears to be significant at .01 level for larger firms during the pre- and 
post-SOX and the size of the board of directors is negative and significant for smaller firms pre- and post-SOX at 
.01 and .05 significance levels, respectively, while positive and marginally significant, at .10 level, for large firms 
only during the post-SOX period.  
 
The overall R-Squared for the pre- and post-SOX periods, as reported in Table 5, is 0.17 and 0.24 for 
smaller firms and 0.30 and 0.37 for larger firms, respectively. The joint test of null hypotheses of coefficients of the 
models equal to zero is rejected for the all estimation models as indicated by the Wald χ2 at any significance level. 
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Table 5 
Cross-Section, Time-Series Regression-Random Effect 
Dependent Variable: Log Pay_Perform 
Variables 
Pre- SOX 
1999-2002 
Post- SOX 
2003-2005 
Small Firms Large Firms Small Firms Large Firms 
Log_Sales 0.4684534*** 
(8.23) 
0.5322644*** 
(9.17) 
0.4845897*** 
(7.88) 
0.5107625*** 
(9.56) 
Ret_3yr 0.5708585*** 
(7.79) 
0.361328*** 
(3.10) 
0.2667519* 
(1.83) 
0.8930323*** 
(6.00) 
Age 0.0105891 
(1.16) 
0.0627407*** 
(6.73) 
-0.0045821 
(-0.51) 
0.0298475*** 
(3.50) 
CEO_Chair -0.1371703 
(-1.65) 
-0.1170197* 
(-1.70) 
-0.052036 
(-0.53) 
0.0303966 
(0.35) 
CCMeet_BdMeet -0.0735929 
(-0.63) 
0.0314679 
(0.32) 
0.0537348 
(0.58) 
-0.103097 
(-1.26) 
CCSize_BdSize -0.6351393 
(-1.70) 
-0.17793 
(-0.54) 
-0.5768886 
(-1.47) 
0.3827898 
(1.09) 
OutDir_BdSize 1.067585*** 
(2.91) 
0.4328401 
(1.37) 
0.342028 
(0.73) 
-0.4074877 
(-1.18) 
Log_BdSize -0.6609829*** 
(-3.22) 
-0.0498016 
(-0.27) 
-0.5298433** 
(-2.29) 
0.4111757** 
(2.03) 
Constant 4.770431*** 
(6.96) 
0.2035336 
(0.27) 
5.681368*** 
(7.98) 
1.460071* 
(1.92) 
R-Squared:     
Within 
between 
overall 
0.2082 
0.1613 
0.1709 
0.1588 
0.3330 
0.3045 
0.0684 
0.2683 
0.2362 
0.2274 
0.3872 
0.3679 
Number of Obs. 623 632 477 477 
Wald 2  148.72 
(0.0000) 
165.06 
(0.0000) 
80.47 
(0.0000) 
190.06 
(0.0000) 
Coefficients Significance Level: *** .01, **.05, *.1 
 
 
Testing Differences between Sub-Samples 
 
We also examined the difference in estimated coefficients by comparing the coefficient for partitioned 
samples.  For example, the estimation models for pre-SOX period, model 4, and post-SOX period, model 5, are 
specified as follows: 
 
Pre-SOX:  Log_PayPerform it =  + (Log_Salesit) + γ(Ret_3yrit) + 1(Ageit) + 2(CEO_Chairit) + 
3(CCMeet_BdMeetit)+ 4(CCSize_BdSizeit) + 5(OutDir_BdSize) + 6(Log_BdSizeit)  + it  +  v it          (4) 
 
Post-SOX:  Log_PayPerform it = ’ + ’(Log_Salesit) + γ’(Ret_3yrit) + 1’(Ageit) + 2’(CEO_Chairit) + 
3’(CCMeet_BdMeetit)+ 4’(CCSize_BdSizeit) + 5’(OutDir_BdSize) + 6’(Log_BdSizeit)  + it  +  v it   (5) 
 
Then, we test the following null hypotheses jointly and individually using Wald χ2:  
 
  -  ’ =0 ,   
γ  -  γ’ = 0,   
1  -  1’ = 0,   
2  -  2’ = 0,   
3  -  3’ = 0,   
4  -  4’ = 0,   
5  -  5’ = 0 
6  -  6’ = 0 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2012 Volume 28, Number 3 
© 2012 The Clute Institute  473 
Where, in this example, , γ, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and ’, γ’, 1’, 2’, 3’, 4’, 5’, 6’ are the two sets of 
estimated parameters for  pre and post-SOX models. 
 
We first examined the pre/post-SOX estimated coefficients as shown in Table 6. The tests of null 
hypotheses of no difference for all parameters in the model jointly as well as the joint test of governance variables’ 
parameters are rejected.  We also examined the null hypothesis of no difference for each pair of parameters.  The 
null hypotheses for Ret_3yr and Log_BdSize are rejected. It appears that firms are even more likely post-SOX to 
focus on returns. However, larger boards are more likely to approve higher pay post-SOX.  The null hypothesis for 
all other tests cannot be rejected at any conventional level. 
 
 
Table 6 
Wald Parameter Tests* 
2 for testing difference between the coefficients 
Variables  (pre-SOX) –’(post-SOX) 
Log_Sales 1.23 
(0.2669) 
Ret_3yr 20.80** 
(0.0000) 
Age 1.30 
(0.2537) 
CEO_Chair 0.60 
(0.4402) 
CCMeet_BdMeet 0.19 
(0.6662) 
CCSize_BdSize 1.97 
(0.1602) 
OutDir_BdSize 1.13 
(0.2868) 
Log_BdSize 10.12** 
(0.0015) 
All Parameters 45.49** 
(0.0000) 
Wald Joint Test of Governance Variables: 13.08** 
(0.0418) 
Age  
CEO_Chair  
CCMeet_BdMeet  
CCSize_BdSize  
OutDir_BdSize  
Log_BdSize  
* 2 for testing equality of the coefficients in the sub samples where 2 Prob. values are shown parenthetically.       
**   cannot Accept  –’ = 0, where  and’ represents the coefficient of variables for Pre and Post-SOX, at .05 significance 
level. Otherwise, the hypothesis of no difference cannot be rejected at .05 level. 
 
 
We then examined the null hypothesis of no difference comparing small or large firms for pre-SOX and 
Post-SOX periods (SOX effect), as shown in Table 7.  The joint test of no difference for all parameters in the model 
is rejected for both small and large groups at the .01 level while the joint test of governance variables’ parameters is 
rejected for only the pre-SOX period. The test of null for individual variables, comparing small and large firms, is 
rejected in the case of Log_Sales (small and large firms) during the pre-SOX and the post-SOX periods, Ret_3yr 
(post-SOX period), CEO age (pre-SOX period), and board size (pre-SOX period).  The null cannot be rejected for 
any other case during either period.    
 
We also compared the parameters small and large firms (Size Effect) during the pre-SOX period and 
repeated this comparison for the post-SOX period.  The joint test of no difference for all parameters in the model is 
rejected for both small and large firms, at the .01 level.  We cannot reject joint test of governance variables’ 
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parameters for either group at the .05 level. The test of null for individual parameters is rejected in the case of 
Log_Sales (small firms), Ret_3yr and CEO age (large firms), and Board Size (small firms). The null cannot be 
rejected for any other case in either group. 
 
 
Table 7 
Wald Parameter Tests* 
2 for testing difference between the coefficients 
Variables 
SOX Effect Size Effect 
Pre-SOX 
 Small Firms – 
’Large Firms 
Post-SOX 
 Small Firms – 
’Large Firms 
Small Firms 
 pre-Sox – 
’post-Sox 
Large Firms 
 pre-Sox – 
’post-Sox 
Log_Sales 4.74** 
(0.0296) 
8.76** 
(0.0031) 
4.78** 
(0.0289) 
1.05 
(0.3057) 
Ret_3yr 0.03 
(0.8627) 
11.50** 
(0.0007) 
2.08 
(0.1492) 
15.57** 
(0.0001) 
Age 5.06** 
(0.0244) 
0.20 
(0.66525) 
0.18 
(0.6683) 
6.19** 
(0.0129) 
CEO_Chair 0.19 
(0.6616) 
0.44 
(0.5084) 
2.02 
(0.1554) 
0.20 
(0.6545) 
CCMeet_BdMeet 0.70 
(0.4019) 
0.07 
(0.7940) 
0.72 
(0.3970) 
0.03 
(0.8717) 
CCSize_BdSize 0.00 
(0.9983) 
0.42 
(0.5145) 
0.35 
(0.5548) 
1.30 
(0.2548) 
OutDir_BdSize 0.11 
(0.7390) 
0.19 
(0.6649) 
0.22 
(0.6380) 
0.92 
(0.3362) 
Log_BdSize 8.72** 
(0.0031) 
0.09 
(0.7623) 
6.43** 
(0.0112) 
2.76 
(0.0968) 
All Parameters 39.73** 
(0.0000) 
22.49** 
(0.0075) 
23.13** 
(0.0041) 
24.71** 
(0.0033) 
Wald Joint Test of 
Governance Variables: 
17.98** 
(0.0063) 
1.74 
(0.9423) 
9.97 
(0.1258) 
8.88 
(0.1802) 
Age     
CEO_Chair     
CCMeet_BdMeet     
CCSize_BdSize     
OutDir_BdSize     
Log_BdSize     
* 2 for testing equality of the coefficients in the sub samples where 2 Prob. values are shown parenthetically.  
**   cannot Accept  –’ = 0, where  and’ represents the coefficient of variables for two sub-samples, at .05 significance level. 
Otherwise, the hypothesis of no difference cannot be rejected at .05 level. 
 
 
Robustness Test 
 
This study follows Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) in treating 2003 as the first year of the post-SOX 
period. The year 2002, the year in which SOX was passed, could be considered a transition year rather than truly 
pre-SOX. To test the impact of 2002, we re-estimated the pre-SOX parameters after dropping the 2002 observations. 
The results for the full sample and pre-SOX periods were substantially the same as those reported in the analysis 
section with a few exceptions. The variable OutDir_BdSize is not significant for the full sample and significant only 
at the 5 percent level during the pre-SOX period. This variable is also less significant, at the 5 percent level, for the 
smaller firms during the pre-SOX period compared to our original analysis. The incentive compensation appears to 
be more sensitive to changes Ret_3yr variable for larger firms, during pre-SOX period, while the coefficient is less 
significant, at 5 percent, than our earlier estimate. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The results of this study indicate that economic determinants and a CEO's age are generally more important 
than the structure of corporate boards of directors in establishing CEO incentive compensation for CEOs who have a 
relatively long standing with their companies. This finding seems plausible because a CEO's experience can be a 
major factor in more established, larger firms. 
 
We also examine the effects of corporate governance on CEO compensation in light of corporate regulatory 
controls introduced after 2002 by the SOX.  Although other studies have examined various aspects of changes in 
CEO compensation pre- and post-SOX, we also inspect the change in coefficients for economic and governance 
factors to determine the influence of SOX. Our results suggest that corporate governance variables are not 
significant post-SOX.  In addition to looking at our full sample for the entire period and pre- and post-SOX, we also 
stratify our sample into two groups by size (sales). We find that there are different patterns and significant influences 
when comparing large and small firms in our sample. In particular, the pre-SOX negative impact of CEO duality 
appears to be driven by larger firms while the unexpected signs of some corporate governance variables appear to be 
associated with smaller firms.  
 
CEO duality was unexpectedly negatively associated with pay, but only during the pre-SOX period. 
Similarly, in unexpected direction, the percentage of outside directors on the board has a positive and significant 
effect on the incentive compensation in the full period and during the pre-SOX period.  However, as shown in our 
partitioned sample, it appears that the influence of this variable is mainly due to smaller firms and during the pre-
SOX period.     
 
We also observe that larger boards tended to limit pay in the full and pre-SOX periods.  Further partitioning 
of our data revealed that this effect also is due to smaller firms during the pre-SOX period. Additionally, we observe 
significantly negative and significantly positive impact of the board size on the compensation for smaller and larger 
firms, respectively, during the post-SOX period.  This latter result may explain the fact that the board size did not 
appear to be significant during post-SOX period, as reported in Table 5.  That is, the opposite and significant impact 
of board size on smaller and larger firms could be masked in the aggregate analysis.  
 
It may be the case that smaller companies have not developed governance mechanisms as sophisticated as 
those of larger companies, due to resource constraints or other factors. These results could also be consistent with 
the substitution hypothesis, where firms with weaker governance mechanisms rely more heavily on performance pay 
to align the interests of shareholders and management (see, e.g., Fahlenbrach, 2009). Our results indicate that CEO 
incentive pay in smaller companies was not only significantly associated with the coefficient for sales pre- and post-
SOX, but it was even more pronounced in both periods than larger firms, and increasingly significant for smaller 
firms as a reaction to SOX (see results in Table 7).  
 
The use of cross-section, time series panel data, together with partitioning of the data based on the firms' 
size, provides a unique focus on incorporating the inherent information for the same firms and CEOs over the full 
period 1999-2005, and the influence of SOX on those firms. Most prior studies use OLS cross-section methodology. 
Some of our findings may be determined, in part, by focusing on firms with the same CEO over time. 
 
The panel data design of this study introduces the risk of “CEO survivorship bias” in our study.  However, 
we believe this design controls the variability that might otherwise be present, due to either the contracting or the 
individual qualifications of the CEO, and the tradeoff seems justified.  This is a possible limitation of the study in 
that our results may not be generalizable to public companies with CEO changes that may be associated with other 
changes in, and influences of, corporate governance and board structure. Future research is needed to better 
understand the dynamics associated with CEOs and boards over time.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
TDC1 
 
 
 
Total compensation comprised of the following: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, 
Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted 
(using Black-Scholes), and Long-Term Incentive Payouts. 
Pay_Perform 
 
The Difference between TDC1 and Salary plus Other Annual 
 
 
Log_Sales 
Logarithm of total net sales 
 
Ret_3yr 
 
 
 
The 3 year total return to shareholders, including the monthly reinvestment of 
dividends. 
 
Board size 
Total number of directors during the fiscal year 
 
Comp Committee size 
 
Total number of directors on the compensation committee during the fiscal year 
 
Board meetings 
Number of board meetings during the fiscal year 
 
 
Comp Committee meetings 
 
 
Total number of compensation committee meetings during the fiscal year 
 
 
CCSize_BdSize 
 
Ratio of  compensation committee size to board of directors size 
 
CCMeet_BdMeet 
Ratio of  compensation committee meetings to board meetings  
 
CEO_Chair 
Indicator variable set to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board of 
directors, otherwise zero 
OutDir_BdSize 
 
 
Ratio of  number of outside directors to board of directors size 
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